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Abstract
In 1996, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The 
HIPC Initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction de-
signed to ensure that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot 
manage (International Monetary Fund, 2011). To date, debt reduc-
tion packages providing US $72 billion under the HIPC Initiative 
have been approved for 36 countries, 32 of them in Africa (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2011). Under the HIPC Initiative, the World 
Bank and IMF Boards first decide whether or not a country is eligible 
for debt relief (decision point document). In a second step, all credi-
tors (multilateral, bilateral, and commercial) commit debt relief to be 
delivered at a “floating” completion point. In between those steps, 
the country tries to implement the policies determined at the deci-
sion point (which are triggers to reaching the completion point). This 
research paper will examine the HIPC Initiative using a secondary 
analysis to determine the effectiveness of this program for indebted 
countries in Africa. The results of this analysis are anticipated to as-
sist in determining weaknesses in debt relief programs, such as the 
HIPC Initiative, as well as indicate historical economic conditions 
that set contemporary cycles of debt in motion in Africa.
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Introduction
Excessive debt exhausts a country’s scarce resources and can con-
strain its economic development. First, debt service may create a shortage 
of liquidity, which crowds out investment. The capacity to accumulate 
productive assets and the ability to adopt new technologies are con-
strained because of lack of funds (Dessy & Vencatachellum, 2007). Sec-
ond, highly indebted countries may suffer from debt extension. This is 
because the marginal benefit from an improvement in their economic sit-
uation can actually be of more benefit to creditors than to the countries 
themselves as they are the ones to carry the full adjustment cost (Bird & 
Milne, 2003). If the resources to service a country’s external debt cannot 
be mobilized, the consequences will be serious economic disruption (Bird 
& Milne, 2003). 
There is little question that most African nations face severe financing 
gaps, which are the most important exogenous determinants of the exter-
nal positions of developing countries. Serious economic disruptions are 
magnified in African nations that already face high barriers to accessing 
capital markets, as well as in nations where the share of the population 
living below the poverty line has increased during the past two decades 
(Nkurunziza, 2005). Therefore, it is argued that the ability of African 
countries to cope with those external shocks, while investing to expand 
their production possibilities, cannot happen until their debt is brought 
down to manageable levels. As a result, proponents of debt cancellation 
have stated that it is both inefficient and immoral for rich countries to not 
forgive the debt of highly indebted African nations (Dessy & Vencatach-
ellum 2007).  
Wahlers (2005) argues that Africa’s underdevelopment is a direct con-
sequence of the development of Europe. Wahlers further argues that 
Europe, for all intents and purposes, underdeveloped Africa because it 
viewed the continent as an outpost of European interest and in many 
ways as a storehouse of resources for the use of European communities 
and not for the African people (Wahlers, 2005). 
 This research paper examined the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative as a secondary analysis to assess the effectiveness of 
this program for indebted countries in Africa. The paper was undertaken 
with the anticipation that the analysis will assist in determining weak-
nesses in debt relief programs, such as the HIPC Initiative, as well as in-
dicate historical economic conditions that set contemporary cycles of 
debt in motion in Africa.
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Literature Review
While African nations have been free from overt colonialism for over 
40 years, the problem of underdevelopment persists. Wahlers (2005) 
stated that the reason Africa is in poor economic shape due to the leg-
acy of past European colonialism. The history of dictatorships, from Idi 
Amin of Uganda to Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now called the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo) to Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, demonstrates 
the problems facing the continent seem to partially be the blame of cor-
ruption within its own ranks (Wahlers, 2005). Some find it difficult to 
blame Africa’s problems on colonialism because they believe there must 
be a point at which African decision-makers and rulers need to shoulder 
some of the responsibility for the countless failures if they want to accept 
praise for the successes (Wahlers, 2005). 
According to the late Claude Ake of Nigeria, a notable social scien-
tist, “the politics of Africa under develops Africa” (Wahlers, 2005). Ake’s 
perspective concerning African politics is not new or limited to the de-
veloping world. Also the connection between politics and debt relief is 
not unique to Africa, but a phenomenon exhibited across developing na-
tions. In 1995, the eight richest countries in the world, Group of 8 (G8; 
United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Rus-
sia), agreed to write off 40 billion US dollars in debt owed by 80 countries 
around the world. Of these 80 countries, 40 are located in Africa. The 
HIPC Initiative could be extended to another 20 countries, bringing the 
overall debt relief to an amount of 55 billion US dollars (Wahlers, 2005). 
In the meantime, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the gov-
ernors of the World Bank also agreed on this package (Wahlers, 2005). 
This HIPC Initiative has to be seen within the framework surrounding 
the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals, more specifi-
cally, its primary goal: to reduce absolute poverty in the world by half 
(Wahlers, 2005). This goal, combined with the massive increase of devel-
oping aid, is an HIPC Initiative called the “Big Push”. Participating Euro-
pean nations promised an increase of developing aid to 0.7% of their GDP 
(Wahlers, 2005). The findings of the Commission for Africa justified the 
increase. During the run-up period to the summit, the Commission found 
that many African states had made “substantial progress” by holding 
regular elections and a noted increase in “good governance”(Wahlers, 
2005). Economists and scholars caution that this tool is not necessarily ef-
fective under a different political, social, and economic context. 
The reaction to the G8 debt relief HIPC Initiative has two sides, those 
who support and those who doubt the HIPC Initiative. Those who sup-
port development policy welcome this step as an important aid measure 
for the developing world. Among those who support debt relief, there 
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are those that take a more skeptical approach regarding overall debt of 
the poorest countries in the world. Such supporters of debt relief say that 
the G8 debt relief HIPC Initiative scope is much too limited. On the other 
end of the spectrum, those who doubt the efficacy of debt relief as a tool 
to initiate development point out that debt relief funds go primarily to 
the same government hands that have wasted money in the past. They 
also point to the fact that countries that have written off debt become fi-
nancial pariahs or that debt relief encourages borrowers to take an exces-
sive amount of new loans, expecting the loans will be forgiven at some 
stage in the future. Hence, this program tends to reward those countries 
that “do not use the money properly” (Wahlers, 2005). This discussion al-
ready shows that the issue of debt relief is not only limited to financial 
operations but belongs to a wider discussion on how to help the develop-
ing world effectively. 
Methods
This research paper analyzed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative by using primary and secondary data from the World 
Bank, Multilateral Debt Relief HIPC Initiative (MDRI), International De-
velopment Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mil-
lennium Development Goals, African Development Fund (ADF), and ed-
itorials. This paper also measured the initial debt before relief, amount of 
debt relief given, current GDP and GNP of the respective nations, and el-
igibility criteria. 
Results
Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries  
(HIPC) Initiative 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, a joint com-
prehensive approach by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank approach to debt reduction, is designed to ensure that no 
poor country faces unmanageable debt burden (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011 HIPC). To date, debt reduction packages under the HIPC Ini-
tiative have been approved for 36 countries, 32 of them in Africa (see Fig-
ure 1), and have provided US $72 billion in debt-service relief over time 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). Since the HIPC Initiative was 
launched in 1996, the international financial community, including mul-
tilateral organizations and governments, has worked together to reduce 
the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries to 
sustainable levels (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). According 
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to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, between 
1970 and 2002, Africa received $540 billion in loans. In that same period, 
Africa paid back $550 billion in principal and interest. Yet in 2002, Africa 
still had $295 billion in debt (McLaughlin, 2005). 
In 1999, according to the International Monetary Fund HIPC (2011), a 
comprehensive review of the HIPC Initiative allowed the IMF to provide 
faster, deeper, and broader debt relief while strengthening the links be-
tween debt relief, poverty reduction, and social policies.  The HIPC Ini-
tiative provides debt relief and low-interest loans to cancel or reduce ex-
ternal debt repayments to sustainable levels. To be considered for the 
HIPC Initiative, countries must face an unsustainable debt burden that 
cannot be managed by traditional means (International Monetary Fund, 
2011 HIPC). Assistance is conditional upon the national governments of 
these countries meeting a range of economic management and perfor-
mance targets (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). According to 
Dessy & Vencatachellum (2007), in June 2005, the HIPC Initiative was 
supplemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief HIPC Initiative (MDRI) 
to help accelerate progress toward the United Nations Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs). The MDRI allows for 100% relief on eligible 
debts for countries that complete the HIPC Initiative process from three 
multilateral institutions: the IMF, the World Bank, and the African De-
velopment Fund (AfDF) (International Monetary Fund, 2011 MDRI). 
Countries must meet specific criteria as part of a two-step process; com-
Figure 1. Map of HIPC Countries (World Bank, 2011)
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mit to poverty reduction through policy changes, and demonstrate 
a good track record. The IMF and the World Bank provide short-term 
debt relief during the first step in this two-step process. When a country 
meets its commitments, full debt-relief is provided (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2011 MDRI). 
The first step of this process is the decision point. To be considered for 
HIPC Initiative assistance, a country must, according to the International 
Monetary Fund (2011 HIPC),
1. Be eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s International Develop-
ment Agency, which provides interest-free loans and grants to the 
world’s poorest countries, and from the IMF’s Extended Credit Fa-
cility, which provides loans to low-income countries at subsidized 
interest rates.
2. Face an unsustainable debt burden that cannot be addressed 
through traditional debt relief mechanisms.
3. Have established a track record of reform and sound policies 
through IMF- and World Bank-supported programs.
4. Have developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
through a broad-based participatory process.
Once a country has made sufficient progress in meeting these four 
criteria, the Executive Boards of the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank formally decide on the country’s eligibility for debt relief, 
and the international community commits to reducing its debt to a sus-
tainable level. Once a country reaches its decision point, it may immedi-
ately begin receiving interim relief on its due debt (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2011 HIPC).
The second step of this process is the completion point. In order to 
receive full and irrevocable reduction in debt under the HIPC Initia-
tive, a country must, according to the International Monetary Fund (2011 
HIPC): 
1. Establish a track record of good performance under loan-supported 
programs from the IMF and the World Bank. 
2. Implement key reforms agreed at the decision point. 
3. Adopt and implement the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Pa-
per (PRSP) for a minimum of one year.
Once a country has met these criteria, it can receive the full debt re-
lief committed at decision point. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (2011), of the 40 African nations eligible or potentially eligible for 
HIPC Initiative assistance, 32 are receiving full debt relief from the IMF 
and other creditors having already reached their completion points (see 
Table 1). Four of the forty African countries have reached their pre-deci-
sion points and four others countries are receiving interim debt relief.
Th e hiPC in i T i a T i v e i n af r i C a n na T i o n s 7
Debt Relief Frees Resources for Social Spending 
Debt relief is one part of a much larger effort to address low-income 
countries’ development needs and confirm that debt sustainability is 
maintained over time. For debt reduction to have a tangible impact on 
poverty, additional money needs to be invested in programs that bene-
fit the poor. Before the 1996 HIPC Initiative, eligible countries were, on 
average, spending slightly more on debt service than on health and ed-
ucation combined (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). Now, 
they have markedly increased their expenditures on health, education, 
and other social services. According to the International Monetary Fund 
HIPC (2011), such spending is, on average, about five times the amount 
of debt-service payments. Also according to the International Monetary 
Fund HIPC (2011), for the 36 countries receiving debt relief, their debt 
service paid, on average, has declined by about two percentage points 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 2001 and 2009. The debt bur-
den of these 36 countries is expected to be reduced by about 80% after 
the full delivery of debt relief (including under the MDRI) (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011 MDRI). To maintain this reduction, countries must 
Table 1. List of Countries That Have Qualified for, are Eligible or Potentially Eli-
gible and May Wish to Receive HIPC Initiative Assistance.  (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2011)
Post-Completion-Point Countries (32)
Afghanistan Ghana Nicaragua
Benin Guinea Bissau Niger
Bolivia Guyana Rwanda
Burkina Faso Haiti São Tomé & Príncipe
Burundi Honduras Senegal
Cameroon Liberia Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Madagascar Tanzania
Republic of Congo Malawi Togo
Democratic Republic of Congo Mali Uganda
Ethiopia Mauritania Zambia
The Gambia Mozambique 
Interim Countries (4)
Chad Côte d’Ivoire 
Comoros Guinea 
Pre-Decision-Point Countries (4)
Eritrea Somalia 
Kyrgyz Republic Sudan
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reduce their debt vulnerabilities by pursuing cautious borrowing poli-
cies and by strengthening their public debt management to reduce debt 
vulnerabilities. 
International Monetary Fund Debt Relief Complemented  
by Other Sources 
About 45% of debt relief funding comes from the IMF and other mul-
tilateral institutions, and 55% is provided by bilateral creditors (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). The estimation of the total cost of 
providing assistance to the 40 countries that have been found eligible or 
potentially eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
is about $75 billion in end-2009 net present value (NVP) terms (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). Currently, resources available are in-
sufficient to finance the debt relief cost to all countries that meet the ini-
tial conditions for debt relief and reach the decision point. The original 
financing plan did not include the cost of debt relief to Sudan and Soma-
lia, or to countries entering the HIPC Initiative after 2006 (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). Should these countries progress to the deci-
sion point, more resources would need to be assembled urgently.
Remaining Challenges  
The eight countries that have not yet completed the requirements for 
full debt relief face common challenges. These challenges include pre-
serving peace and stability, improving governance, and delivering basic 
services (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). Another challenge is 
to ensure that eligible countries get full debt relief from all creditors. The 
largest creditors (the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the 
IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank, and all Paris Club creditors) 
provide debt relief “in line with their commitments under the HIPC Ini-
tiative, and even beyond. There are those who are lagging behind, and” 
have only delivered a small share of their expected relief so far (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2011). Smaller multilateral institutions, non-Paris 
Club official bilateral creditors, and commercial creditors account for 
about 25% of total HIPC Initiative costs (International Monetary Fund, 
2011 HIPC). Non-Paris Club bilateral creditors as a whole have delivered 
close to 40% of their share of HIPC Initiative debt relief, but about half 
of these creditors have not delivered any relief at all (International Mon-
etary Fund, 2011 HIPC). A number of commercial creditors have initi-
ated litigations against highly indebted countries, raising significant legal 
challenges to further the burden of sharing among all creditors, including 
the multilateral institutions (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). 
Those who doubt the HIPC’s scope and structure have criticized the 
HIPC’s definition of debt sustainability, arguing that the debt-to-export 
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and debt-to-government-revenues criteria were arbitrary and too restric-
tive (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC).  As evidence, those who 
doubt the HIPC Initiative highlighted that:
1. By 1999, only four countries had received any debt relief under 
HIPC.
2. The six-year program was too long and inflexible to meet the indi-
vidual needs of debtor nations (International Monetary Fund, 2011 
HIPC). 
3. The IMF and the World Bank did not cancel any debt until the com-
pletion point, leaving countries under the burden of their debt pay-
ments while “they struggled to institute structural reforms” (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2011).  
4. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) conditions of-
ten undermined poverty-reduction efforts. For example, privatiza-
tion of utilities tended to raise the cost of services beyond the citi-
zens’ ability to pay. 
5. Creditors designed the HIPC Initiative to protect creditor inter-
ests, leaving countries with unsustainable debt burdens even upon 
reaching the decision point (International Monetary Fund, 2011 
HIPC).  
Inadequate debt relief for indebted countries means that they will 
need to spend more on servicing debts than actively investing in pro-
grams that can reduce poverty (International Monetary Fund, 2011).
Response to Criticism
In response to the shortcomings of the HIPC Initiative that its critics 
have highlighted, The IMF began modifications in 1996 and first restruc-
tured the HIPC Initiative in 1999 with revisions that modified HIPC’s 
threshold requirements. The HIPC Initiative addressed its shortcomings 
by expanding its definition of unsustainable debts. The expansion ex-
tended greater and quicker relief to more counties. Today, HIPC defines 
three minimum requirements for participation in the program (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC):
1. The country must show its debt is unsustainable as before; however, 
the targets for determining sustainability decreased to a debt-to-ex-
port ratio of 150% and a debt-to-government-revenues ratio of 250% 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC).  
2. The country must be considered “sufficiently poor” in order to qual-
ify for loans from the World Bank’s International Development 
Association or the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF, the successor to ESAF), which provide long-term, interest-
free loans to the world’s poorest nations (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011 HIPC).  
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3. The country must establish a track record of reforms to help prevent 
future debt crises (International Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC). 
In addition to the modified threshold requirements, the 1999 revi-
sions introduced several other changes. First, the six-year structure was 
abandoned and replaced by a “floating completion point” that allows 
countries to progress towards completion in fewer than six years (In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 2011 HIPC).  Second, the revised HIPC al-
lows for interim debt relief so that countries begin to see partial relief be-
fore reaching the completion point (International Monetary Fund, 2011 
HIPC).  Third, the PRGF heavily modified ESAF by curtailing the num-
ber and specifics of IMF conditions and by encouraging greater input 
from the local community into the program’s design (International Mon-
etary Fund, 2011 HIPC). Given the “voluntary nature of creditor partic-
ipation in the HIPC Initiative”, the IMF and the World Bank will con-
tinue to encourage creditors to participate in the HIPC Initiative and to 
deliver fully their share of HIPC Initiative debt relief (International Mon-
etary Fund, 2011 HIPC).
Valid Changes in Nations’ Debt
Debt cancellation agreed upon by rich-nation finance ministers will 
enable Zambia to hire 7,000 new teachers (McLaughlin, 2005). Likewise, 
Tanzania will no longer spend 12% of its annual budget servicing its 
debts (McLaughlin, 2005). Instead of spending the annual budget servic-
ing debt, it could build new hospitals and roads. Eventually, a total of 38 
nations with populations totaling 552 million people may get full debt 
relief, for all the impressive figures, “the deal strikes a middle ground” 
(McLaughlin, 2005). For some, these concessions are too small given that, 
at most, it cancels less than one-sixth of Africa’s $295 billion debt, while 
leaving out crucial countries like Nigeria (given that Nigeria is not eligi-
ble for the HIPC Initiative). For other countries, it is too risky given that, 
by erasing bad debts, it allows struggling nations to apply for new loans. 
McLaughlin cautions that “it could spark a new cycle of dependency” 
(McLaughlin, 2005). “In theory, it primes the pump,” says Stephen Hayes 
of the Corporate Council on Africa in Washington (McLaughlin, 2005). 
It may also help countries lift themselves up through better education, 
stronger agriculture, and expanded trade.
But who pays? Consider three things: first, in the short term, “it’s not 
all that expensive” (McLaughlin, 2005). The United States plans to donate 
up to $1.75 billion over ten years. This donation is part of the share of a 
pledge by rich nations to cover $16.7 billion in debt repayments the 18 
countries would have made (McLaughlin, 2005). Second, one of the larger 
debts, some at $6 billion, will be paid by the IMF (McLaughlin, 2005). The 
IMF is one of the global institutions to whom poor African nations owe 
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debt. Third, the critical relief should have come after 2008, when the US 
and other G8 nations supplied billions of US dollars to cover the amount 
owed to two other big lending institutions: the World Bank and the Afri-
can Development Bank (ADB). The G8 ministers promised to “cover the 
full costs” of the loans (McLaughlin, 2005).
One of the risks is that rich nations would not fully replenish “global 
lenders’ coffers, which could trim the size of future loans” (McLaugh-
lin, 2005). Should this HIPC Initiative succeed, poor countries, in theory, 
would not need to borrow as much because the debt relief will boost their 
economies. This HIPC Initiative is expected to save these African na-
tions a total of about $1.5 billion in debt payments each year (McLaugh-
lin, 2005). This $1.5 billion could be earmarked for education, healthcare, 
agriculture, and infrastructure. According to the CIA World Factbook 
(2011), the 18 governments’ total spending was $23.5 billion in 2004, 
“so the $1.5 billion represents a sizable, though not enormous, amount 
of freed-up cash” (McLaughlin, 2005). In Tanzania, a previous debt-re-
lief deal helped end school fees, enabling 1.5 million more children to at-
tend classes, says DATA, a debt-relief group in Washington (McLaugh-
lin, 2005).
African Nations’ Opinions
The deal was generally well received in Africa. “We greatly appre-
ciate the HIPC Initiative,” said Ugandan official James Nsaba Buturo. It 
means “we can have more money ... directed to education, health, infra-
structure, and social sectors,” said the Prime Minister of Mozambique 
Luisa Diogo (McLaughlin, 2005). There is concern in Africa about a ma-
jor missing African nation: Nigeria. Unlike the initial 18 nations, Nige-
ria does not pass “muster for cutting corruption and better transparency” 
(McLaughlin, 2005). As West Africa’s anchor country, Nigeria is the key 
to regional stability. A recent US intelligence assessment warned it could 
face “outright collapse” in the next 15 years (McLaughlin, 2005). It is the 
world’s seventh-largest oil producer, yet has $36 US dollars billion in 
debt (McLaughlin, 2005). The G8 ministers acknowledged Nigeria’s need 
for debt relief, “but they’ve (G8 ministers) got to do more than that,” ar-
gues Francis Kornegay of the Center for Policy Studies in Johannes-
burg: “If you’re talking about stabilizing Africa, you’ve got to focus on 
countries like Nigeria, Sudan, Congo, and Angola, which pull regional 
weight.” None of these listed countries were included in initial rounds, 
mostly because they are “considered too corrupt” (McLaughlin, 2005).
 Africans worry that the G8 focus on Africa will distract from African 
solutions to the continent’s problems. “There’s a serious concern it might 
eclipse NEPAD” and other indigenous institutions, says Mr. Kornegay, 
referring to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, a South-Af-
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rica-backed program that seeks to boost good governance (McLaugh-
lin, 2005).  Another key concern is that the debt relief is not innovative 
enough. “There have got to be mechanisms so the same thing doesn’t 
happen over and over,” says Mr. Hayes, referring to the aid and lend-
ing paradigms that have dominated development work for decades. “I 
don’t think Africa develops without a middle class,” he says, and that 
will emerge only through trade and entrepreneurship. “But that’s where 
issues like easing trade barriers come in,” he says (McLaughlin, 2005).
The industrialized world now realizes debt relief can free funds for 
social programs in poor African Nations. Because of the HIPC Initiative, 
the country of Burkina Faso has reduced the cost of AIDS drugs; Mozam-
bique has vaccinated half a million children against easily preventable 
diseases and electrified rural schools and hospitals. Tanzania has built 
32,000 new classrooms and hired 18,000 more teachers. Uganda has filled 
schools by abolishing tuition fees (Faris, 2004). But in Africa, such lim-
ited relief may not be enough. Despite $29 billion in write-offs to date, the 
countries in the HIPC program still collectively owe an estimated $90 bil-
lion to Western countries and organizations like the World Bank and the 
IMF (Faris, 2004).  
Discussion
Uganda: The First Country 
In 1998 Uganda became the first country to have its debt burden eased 
under the HIPC Initiative. Classrooms in Uganda were half empty be-
cause parents could not afford the $40-$50 annual tuition (Faris, 2004). 
According to Faris (2004), the World Bank stated that even nations that 
are in the HIPC Initiative program pay on average more than 12% of their 
revenues each year to creditors from the developed world (see Figure 2). 
Loan repayments often exceed spending on health care and education, 
and governments continue to sink deeper into debt simply by paying in-
terest on their loans. 
The HIPC Initiative reduced Uganda’s loan payments on the condi-
tion that the savings would be channeled into health care, agricultural 
development, and free primary education. 
Yet to many Ugandans, debt relief appears to be working. “We’ve 
turned around a lot of things here,” says Francis Omaswa, director gen-
eral of Uganda’s Health Services (Faris, 2004). The HIPC Initiative pro-
gram cut Uganda’s loan payments by approximately $90 million a year 
(Faris, 2004). The funds freed by this cut were used to hire hundreds of 
teachers and build new schools and health facilities (Faris, 2004). Enroll-
ment in the nation’s primary schools jumped from 5.3 million in 1997 to 
7.6 million in 2003 (Faris, 2004). Immunization rates for tetanus, whoop-
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ing cough and diphtheria jumped from 49% in 1998 to 83% in 2004, and 
the HIV infection rate was halved over the same period. 
Sustainability of Debt Burden and Health Funding
According to the World Bank (2011), the HIPC Initiative was set up 
for the poorest of nations, for which the debt of the HIPC countries was, 
on average, more than four times their annual export earnings, and 120% 
of GNP. As it has already been stated, the HIPC Initiative has been met 
with an ample amount of criticism for not actually helping the countries 
it is supposed to be helping (the indebted nations/debtors) while help-
ing those it was not necessarily meant to help (the rich nations/creditors) 
by making sure that the debt is repaid. Guttal also believes that the HIPC 
Figure 2. African Nations and Debt Service (International Development Associa-
tion, 2005).
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process is aimed not at canceling debts, but at ensuring that they can be 
repaid. “It has little to do with enhancing human development, reduc-
ing poverty, or even increasing economic growth in the debtor countries. 
Rather, it is designed to massage debt figures down to a level where they 
would be deemed ‘sustainable’ again according to the criteria of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF)” (Guttal, 2000, p.35). 
It has been argued that the HIPC Initiative functions as extortion 
forced on poor, highly indebted nations to convince them to stay within 
the debt-finance system (Guttal, 2000, p.36). This HIPC Initiative seeks to 
make and keep poor countries sufficiently solvent so that they can con-
tinue paying their debts to international creditors. Guttal argues that 
“easing of eligibility conditions for debt reduction, interim strategies 
for providing credits and grants, and announcements of a multi-billion 
dollar trust fund for fighting poverty” are all ways to soothe frustrated 
debtor governments, which are fed up with the conditioning of meager 
debt relief benefits on continued adherence to structural adjustment type 
policies (Guttal, 2000, p.36). By the end of 1998, HIPC had made little 
progress and only three of the four nations qualified for extremely small 
amounts of debt reduction are African (Uganda, Guyana and Mozam-
bique) (Gutta, 2000, p.34). In September 1999, in reference to a global re-
view of the HIPC Initiative and growing pressure from civil society orga-
nizations and proposals, the World Bank and IMF announced changes to 
the HIPC Initiative. The new, Enhanced HIPC Initiative used more flexi-
ble criteria to assess debt sustainability and eligibility for debt relief, and 
offered quicker and greater support to more countries. 
The World Bank and the IMF have widely promoted the Enhanced 
HIPC as an innovative and groundbreaking HIPC Initiative towards debt 
relief. The key benefits that the Enhanced HIPC Initiative promises are 
rhetoric when compared with reality. The World Bank claims that, exter-
nal debt servicing will be cut by approximately $50 billion through the 
new HIPC framework, and that the World Bank itself will reduce its debt 
claims by nearly $11 billion (Guttal, 2000, p.35). In reality, the current re-
lief amounts proposed by the major multilateral creditors are far from the 
promised $50 billion reduction. The World Bank proposed to reduce $5.7 
billion of the debt through the International Development Association 
(IDA) and $600 million through the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) (Guttal, 2000, p.35). These proposals do 
not fulfill the $11 billion promise. Further, after debt relief, many coun-
tries will continue to spend more on debt servicing than on priority areas 
such as health, food security, and education. 
The current method used to assess debt sustainability is deeply 
flawed. The current method is based purely on econometric and financial 
indicators (debt/export and debt/government revenue ratios). The cur-
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rent method also does not take into account the chronic levels of poverty 
in the HIPC Initiative or what debt servicing would cost the population 
of a chronically poor country even if its financial indicators showed that 
the country’s debt was “sustainable” (Guttal, 2000, p.38).
Research conducted by Jubilee (2000) shows that the first five recipi-
ents of HIPC Initiative assistance will continue paying more than half a 
billion dollars every year to external creditors. Additionally, countries al-
ready in the pipeline for HIPC Initiative assistance will continue to allo-
cate more towards debt servicing than they will to public healthcare and 
education. Despite claims that the funds “freed up” from debt reduction 
can be redirected towards social spending, reports from Africa show that 
increased expenditures in areas such as health and education are minis-
cule in light of the combined cutbacks in these areas over fifteen years of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs; Jubilee, 2000). 
The Challenge of Maintaining 
A report from the World Bank and IMF released in April 2001 casted 
a dark shadow over their HIPC Initiative, showing little confidence that 
the controversial debt package will provide an end to the debt crisis for 
the countries involved. The report “The Challenge of Maintaining Long-
Term External Debt Sustainability” emerged after a number of rewrites, 
and confirmed debt campaigners’ concerns that HIPC does not reduce 
debt to a low enough level (Global Issues, 2001). The report gave a re-
newed urgency to discussions on debt by the G8 finance ministers at the 
World Bank and IMF spring meetings in Washington, D.C. on April 29, 
2011. Funds are urgently needed for health care, especially in light of the 
spreading HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa (Global Issues, 2001).
Debt campaigners have long argued that the 150% debt-to-exports 
level underpinning the HIPC Initiative is based on precarious projec-
tions of export growth (Global Issues, 2001). This embarrassing report 
acknowledged for the first time that original export growth predictions 
were overly optimistic (Global Issues, 2001). The report shows how if ex-
ports grow more realistically at an average of 4.2%, in line with 1990 - 
1999 levels, debt levels will have risen above the declared “sustainability 
threshold” to 160% by 2005, reaching around 180% by 2015 (Global Is-
sues, 2001).
Three of these countries, Bolivia, Malawi, and Niger, will not reach 
the 150% threshold in the first place because of export growth rate vola-
tility. Three further countries (Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and Tanzania) are 
not predicted to reach the 150% level until the medium term because of 
anticipated new borrowing. Even for countries that do reach the 150% 
debt-to-export level, the World Bank and the IMF acknowledge that the 
HIV/AIDS emergency in many African HIPCs will mean that debt levels 
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will soon rise. Longer-term growth prospects can be undermined by nat-
ural disasters, war, or health threats such as the AIDS epidemic (Global 
Issues, 2001). HIV/AIDS is compounding the failures of HIPC and mak-
ing delay more costly and inexcusable. In such cases, in the absence of 
adequate grant financing, external indebtedness may need to rise to ac-
commodate the financing of reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
Despite the overwhelming evidence presented in the World Bank/
IMF report that the HIPC Initiative is not delivering sustainable debt lev-
els, the World Bank and the IMF do not consider the furthering debt can-
cellation. Instead they focus only on solutions through economic growth 
and policy reform, while they examine the importance of future financ-
ing patterns. While these are crucial to long term debt sustainability, the 
starting point must be to make debt repayments affordable (Global Is-
sues, 2001). The IMF, World Bank, and their shareholders have the re-
sources to cancel 100% of the debts these institutions are owed by the 
poorest countries (Global Issues, 2001). Even so, the HIPC Initiative is 
failing yet again to meet its stated objectives. The question is now: is the 
World Bank and the IMF are more “interested in saving cash or saving 
lives?” (Global Issues, 2001).
Conclusion
In conclusion, debt is not just a financial or a political problem, but in 
every way a social one. This research paper examined the HIPC Initiative 
using secondary analysis to examine the effectiveness of this program for 
indebted countries in Africa. The results of this analysis assisted in deter-
mining valid weaknesses in the HIPC Initiative, as well as indicated his-
torical economic conditions that set modern cycles of debt in motion in 
Africa. 
The HIPC Initiative is not an outright debt cancellation HIPC Initia-
tive. It is a program designed to lower debts to a “sustainable” level. Be-
cause there are so many strict requirements for qualifying to receive debt 
relief under the HIPC Initiative, this program is seen as a hindrance for 
impoverished and indebted nations. The HIPC Initiative’s other weak-
nesses include that it does not involve enough countries, it does not de-
liver enough debt relief, and the relief is delivered far too slowly. The 
debt crisis is an immediate concern that must be addressed quickly and 
efficiently. Failing to do so compromises the well being of over a billion 
people in indebted African nations. 
The HIPC Initiative is controlled by wealthy creditors/nations and 
fails to acknowledge the important role creditors played in the accumula-
tion of unsustainable debt. Instead of accepting their part in all this, cred-
itors presented the HIPC Initiative as an almost humanitarian mecha-
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nism to help poor nations that found themselves in a debt cycle due to 
over-borrowing and poor economic management. Also, once countries 
qualify for HIPC classification, they must comply with strict macroeco-
nomic requirements prescribed by the IMF, known as Structural Adjust-
ment or Austerity Programs. It takes years to implement these policies 
before any debt cancellation is delivered. Countries must also be in an 
agreement with the IMF to borrow more money in order to remain eligi-
ble for debt relief through the HIPC Initiative.
Nevertheless, it is crucial that the indebted African nations acknowl-
edge their responsibilities, including the awareness and need to shape 
their own future. This will mean that deliberations of debt relief will not 
be limited to the question of debt relief only, but also the need to focus 
on the potentially successful social and financial opportunities African 
nations have to offer, as well as on how to use development aid more 
efficiently.
Debt is one of the best instruments of power and control, arguably 
even far superior to colonialism. It would be interesting to examine the 
HIPC Initiative through the lens of post-colonial theory as further direc-
tion for this research. Control through debt not only requires monetary 
changes in infrastructure but actually makes indebted African citizens 
pay for their own oppression.
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